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LAW AS SCIENCE:
REVISITING LANGDELL’S PARADIGM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY
NANCY COOK*

ABSTRACT
This Article examines the idea that law is science, a notion that was
long ago introduced into the law school curriculum in the guise of the
“casebook method” and Socratic teaching by Dean Christopher Columbus
Langdell at Harvard Law School. This Article posits that radical shifts in
the philosophy of science merit a return to the idea of law as science, even
as law schools flounder in search of a pedagogical ideology that is
consistent with modern law practice. Two scientific philosophers, in
particular, are the focus: Karl Popper, whose work repudiated the
longstanding observationalist-inductivist account of scientific method; and
Thomas Kuhn, whose seminal book, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS, describes the work of scientists as operating with a series of
paradigms. Derivative theories demonstrating the efficacy of scientific
methods that elevate the significance of invention and creative
reconceptualization have application to law in a time of rapid technological
innovation and globalization.

* Vaughan G. Papke Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota School of Law. I
had the opportunity to workshop a version of this piece at the NYU and Clinical Law Review
Writers Workshop. Thanks especially to Gemma Smyth, Bob Seibel, Karen Tokarz, Michael
Pinard, David Koelsch, and Margaret Barry for comments.
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INTRODUCTION

This short Article revisits an old notion: the idea that law is science.
In addressing this topic, this Article briefly examines the origins of the idea
of law as science in the context of the late nineteenth century when
Christopher Columbus Langdell first introduced the concept at Harvard
Law School.
As a general matter, science is “[t]he observation,
identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical
explanation of phenomena,” or a methodological approach to knowledge
acquisition.1 The science paradigm advocated by Langdell was rooted in
the accepted wisdom of the time that the work of science was to uncover –
to discover – immutable laws of nature.2 More than a century later, even
after considerable and persistent critiques of the methods adopted to lead
law students “scientifically” to the “discovery” of law’s basic principles,
legal academics continue to follow the Langdellian approach to law and
legal education, if for reasons other than those expressed by Langdell
1. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1560 (4th ed.
2006).
2. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 17 (1983).
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himself.3 In light of this history, both the persistence of Langdell-inspired
teaching methods and the persistent critiques of the same, this Article posits
that law may indeed be like science, although not science as it was
generally understood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Rather, law may be understood to be, as a growing number of scientific
philosophers maintain, a process of invention or creative
reconceptualization. Accordingly, viewed from a modern perspective,
science may well be a still useful – and needed – paradigm for today’s
lawyers and legal educators.
In Langdell’s time, one of the attractions of science as an analogy to
law was its purported certainty and predictability. In science, as in law,
however, these characteristics have been demonstrated to be no more than
wishful thinking. Yet science still has its attractions. Traditional scientific
methods are useful as a means of testing knowledge and creating
opportunities for the expansion of knowledge through a process of
perception or discovery.4 Additionally, science – the science of Bacon5 and
Newton,6 and even Aristotle7 – is the foundation of technology or invention,
and invention is transformative in daily human life, a value that is hard to
overstate. The critical rationalists,8 who followed Karl Popper,9 and the
science studies sociologists, adherents to Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy,10
have offered theories allowing for the tentative acceptance, deconstruction,
and reconstruction of conceptual paradigms.11 The new science recognizes
the benefits of received beliefs, designated as principles or rules, but is also
keenly aware of the limitations of those beliefs. Today, the scientific
method is understood to consist of more than the piling of newly discovered
“truths” onto existing ones through discovery, testing, hypothesizing, and
retesting; it involves an active reconceptualization of what is true and the
generation of whole new conceptual paradigms.

3. While not often legitimated by reference to Langdell principles, law schools still largely
adhere to the methodology. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 2-3, 5 (2007) (noting, inter alia, that Langdellian
case-dialogue method, which “socializes” law students very quickly and inculcates an ability to
“think like a lawyer,” remains the predominant teaching mode for American law schools as of the
time of the writing of the report).
4. See infra pp. 25-27.
5. See infra pp. 26-27.
6. See infra pp. 27-29.
7. See infra pp. 25-27.
8. See infra p. 38.
9. See infra pp. 38-41.
10. See infra pp. 39-42.
11. See infra pp. 41-42.
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In approaching law in this way, this Article does not intend to spark
debates about the relative values of Langdell’s science paradigm so much as
to point out the void that has been left by the nearly complete erosion of the
original paradigm, and to postulate that it might be filled by a fully updated
science paradigm. Although some have displayed a surprisingly fierce
loyalty to the underlying theories on which the Langdell approach to
“thinking like a lawyer” was based, it can hardly be denied that scientific
theory has come a long way since Langdell hitched Harvard Law School’s
star to “the scientific method.”12 But it also bears noting that, as a general
matter, one great strength of science is that it is self-correcting. The nature
of scientific inquiry demands that scientists abandon theories when they are
shown to be irrational or unsupportable. The scientific method is not an
inalterable recipe; it requires intellect, imagination, and creativity. In recent
times, in fact, it has been emphasized that science is an ongoing cycle,
constantly developing more useful, accurate and comprehensive models and
methods.13 If law is viewed this way, the Langdell notion that its core
principles can be “discovered” loses efficacy. At the same time, however,
in keeping with modern characterizations of science, law could be viewed
as an ongoing dynamic, dependent on past models, developments, and
understandings. The legal academy, in keeping with this evolved
perspective, could preserve the “law as science” paradigm by expanding
pedagogical methods in the first year to include a focus on understanding
law as a creative and inventive process that is distinctly different from – or
certainly more complex than – a process of discovery.
The Article is broken down into five Parts. Following this brief
introduction in Part I, Part II, The Old Paradigm, provides the historical
background and context for understanding the proposed paradigmatic shift.
Part III, An Imperfect Evolution, explores the continuing utilization of the
original scientific method paradigm, as well as the changing forms and
rationalizations that have accompanied its use. In Part IV, The New
Scientific Paradigm, twentieth century developments in science are used to
revisit the Langdellian premise and redefine the parameters of a scientific-

12. See infra pp. 24-26; 29-32.
13. This can be understood by a simple example: When Einstein developed his SPECIAL
AND GENERAL THEORIES OF RELATIVITY, he did not wholly discount Newton’s PRINCIPIA
(PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA 1687). In fact, if phenomena that Newton
could not have observed, given the technological constraints of the time, are removed from
Einstein’s theories, Newton’s equations remain. Einstein’s theories are expansions and
refinements of Newton’s theories based on increased data and shifts in perspective. They validate,
rather than undermine, Newton’s accomplishments. See Stephen W. Hawking, Newton’s
Principia, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF GRAVITATION 1, 4 (Stephen W. Hawking & Werner
Israel eds., 1989).
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method analogy for law school pedagogy. Finally, Part V consists of
applications of the revised paradigm in the context of doctrinal law courses.
Using the legal principles and paradigms relating to defenses to negligence,
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and statutory
construction of sexual harassment, the applicability of scientific method is
demonstrated. The Article notes in conclusion that the science paradigm of
the twenty-first century provides a shift in perspective that allows for a
reordering of knowledge, one which is not only more inclusive of multiple
existing realities, but opens the gates for creativity and new understandings
of law in context and in operation.
II. THE OLD PARADIGM
At Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century, Langdell sought
to modernize professional education by incorporating the best known
scientific methods into the classroom laboratory. His basic pedagogical
approach to the teaching of contracts, generally referred to as “Socratic
method,” is still widely in use in American law schools.
A. SCIENCE AS A CHOSEN CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF THE LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
Since the years of Langdell’s reign at Harvard,14 the first-year
curriculum of the vast majority of the nation’s law schools has been
primarily about the teaching of doctrine and, more specifically, common
law doctrine.15 The origins of this agenda, the Harvard method, came about
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when science was the rage in
intellectual circles, and law, as a profession and an academic discipline, was
anxious to be admitted to the university academy.16 Then, as today, people
wanted law to be predictable and neutral.17 Professionals were loathe to
admit to uncertainty about the principles governing judicial decisionmaking and sought a conceptual frame that would both bring order to chaos
and render the teaching of the subject rigorous enough to merit university
admission. Science provided that conceptual framework.18 In this

14. Langdell served as dean from 1870 to 1895. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF
MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 2 (Daniel Ernst & Thomas
A. Green eds., 2009). His teaching career spanned another five years. Id. at 8.
15. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About it, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 649 (2007).
16. See KIMBALL, supra note 14, at 345.
17. See Grey, supra note 2, at 45.
18. See id. at 17.
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environment, a relative upstart at Harvard Law School, Langdell,
introduced the notion that law is science and should be taught as such.19
In the late nineteenth century, the scientific system of acquiring
knowledge was viewed as completely objective, rational, and empirical.
Scientific theories and laws were believed to be conclusively confirmed or
conclusively falsified on the basis of objective data.20 This provided the
kind of certainty that many craved, especially in the wake of an
Enlightenment that had exposed as irrational many belief systems anchored
in irrefutable religious or mythological tenets.21
Certainty could be achieved through “the scientific method,” which had
roots in classical philosophy. One of Aristotle‘s contentions was that
universal truths can be known from observation of particular things; he
thereby provided one of the primary ingredients of scientific tradition:
empiricism. Aristotle used induction as a way of reconciling abstract
thought with observation.22 Although he did not claim that knowledge
acquired by induction constitutes scientific knowledge, he saw induction as
a necessary prelude to scientific inquiry, in that measured and detailed
observations could provide the premises required to engage in scientific
experimentation.23 Induction became the foundation of modern science,
later advocated and popularized by Francis Bacon.24
Baconian inductivism was the apex of scientific method in the early
seventeenth century.25 The basic technique was the collection of copious
observations, theoretically uninfluenced by any prior prejudice or
intellectual preconceptions, followed by an inductive discovery of
operational laws or theories gained by generalizing from the data.26 But the
weaknesses of induction as an overarching approach to science were soon
exposed. The method is problematical not least because one initial
condition – freedom from theoretical preconceptions – is an impossibility.27
19. Id. at 5.
20. See id. at 17.
21. Rubin, supra note 15, at 624.
22. Christof Rapp, The Nature and Goals of Rhetoric, in A COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 579,
580 (Georgios Anagnostopoulos ed., 2009).
23. Aristotle attributes the idea of induction to Socrates. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk.
VIII, at 220 (John H. McMahon trans., George Bell & Sons 1904).
24. KARL POPPER, THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK: IN DEFENCE OF SCIENCE AND
RATIONALITY 84 (M.A. Notturno ed., 1994) [hereinafter POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK].
25. Grey, supra note 2, at 12-13; Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33.
26. Francis Bacon, Thoughts and Conclusions on the Interpretation of Nature or a Science
Productive of Works, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS BACON 73, 89 (Benjamin Farrington trans.,
Liverpool Univ. Press 1964) (1653).
27. See COLIN HOWSON, HUME’S PROBLEM: INDUCTION AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF
BELIEF 10-11 (2000); KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 7-10 (Routledge
Classics 2002) (1935) [hereinafter POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY].
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In fact, when using inductivism to arrive at natural laws, certain theoretical
preconceptions are vital. To generalize from the data, the individual must
assume uniform operation of nature, that is, that the laws apply equally to
physical processes not observed.28
An answer to this dilemma was found in another form of Aristotelian
logic: deductive reasoning.29 Using syllogisms, scientists could infer new
universal truths from those already established. Deductive reasoning was
particularly suitable in a world in which change, or evolution, was deemed
to be part of the nature of things. The deductive method imposed
continuing responsibilities on scientists to collect increasingly more data to
measure the consistency of the applicability of existing known laws. This
process, with its heavy reliance on empirical observation, was followed by
modification or rejection of existing laws as necessitated by conflicting
comparative results.30
But this approach had limited utility as well. One problem is that not
all data is sensory. Science deals with objects that cannot be directly
observed, such as subatomic particles and the force of gravity. Even the
application of mathematics to natural phenomena was severely limited by
this method, since most of nature (i.e., the empirical world) is in a constant
state of nonlinear change, and the mathematics of the time was only able to
deal with phenomena that remained more or less static. With the invention
of calculus, generally attributed to Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibnez, mathematics was able to describe change.31 Where previously,
mathematics – geometry and early number theory, in particular – were,
through inductivism, identified as part of the ideal, unchanging world,
empiricism became the method of choice to learn about the ever-changing
environment.
Newtonian theory, eventually termed hypothetico-deductivism, was the
paradigm shift needed to make mathematics applicable to both the static
and dynamic aspects of the empirical world.32 The process is basically one
in which human irrationality is quarantined: the beginning point, or
hypothesis, is followed by deductive predictions, which can then be tested,
through repeated experimentation, against empirical data. The sources of
theory are irrelevant in hypothetico-deductivism since, regardless of origin,

28.
29.
30.
31.

See HOWSON, supra note 27, at 10-11.
Rapp, supra note 22, at 580.
See POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 17-20.
STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
INNOVATION 261 (2010).
32. Peter Achinstein, Introduction: Hypotheti-Deductivism, the Mill-Whewell Debate and
the Wave Theory of Light, in SCIENCE RULES 127, 127 (Peter Achinstein ed., 2004).
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theories can be tested against empirical findings and confirmed or refuted.
A theory is validated not by reference to its historical source, but within a
defined, temporal universe, through a laborious method of verification.
Newton’s work became a model that other sciences sought to emulate,
and his approach was foundational to much of natural philosophy
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.33 The basic
method used for scientific inquiry, still in general application today,34
consists of a methodological paradigm combining these concepts:
operations, observations, models, and a utility function for evaluating
models. “Operations” in this context implies that some action is being done
to the system being investigated; “observation” is activity undertaken as
and after the operation is done to the system.35 A model may be a
hypothesis, theory, or the phenomenon under study; utility function is the
means by which the usefulness of the model is measured.36 The method has
been broken down into operational components, generally consisting of:
1. Defining the question;
2. Gathering data (observing, measuring);
3. Forming a hypothesis;
4. Experimenting and recording observed data;
5. Analyzing data;
6. Interpreting data and drawing conclusions that serve as a starting
point for a new hypothesis;
7. Publishing results; and
8. Retesting.37
33. Some of his methods were later systematized by John Stuart Mill. Among the efforts
made to classify fields of study outside physical sciences as science were those by WILLIAM
STANLEY JEVONS in his THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE: A TREATISE ON LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC
METHOD (1887). Jevons argued for the centrality of the hypothetico-deductive method in the
logic of science and framed the methodology in terms of probability, which he then applied to
economic laws. Similarly, the idea that law was, like any physical science, a coherent system
built on fixed principles, was the standard view of the time. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking
Law and ____ Really Seriously: Before, During and after “The Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555,
556-67 (2007).
34. Although these methodological elements and this organization of procedures tend to be
more characteristic of natural sciences than social sciences, the cycle of formulating hypotheses,
testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses in social science research fields
resembles the cycle described.
35. See generally RICHARD P. FEYNMAN ET AL., SIX EASY PIECES: ESSENTIALS OF PHYSICS
EXPLAINED BY ITS MOST BRILLIANT TEACHER 24 (1965); JEVONS, supra note 33, at 265-66.
36. See generally PETER GEOFFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 6-17 (2003); LUDWICK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A
SCIENTIFIC FACT 66-71 (Thaddeus J. Trenn ed., 1981).
37. There are many ways the components of scientific methods have been described. While
the language varies somewhat and the specific characterization of the actions may differ, in
general these eight steps capture the range of these descriptions. See infra notes 44, 45, 135, &
137 (containing different variations on which this list is based).
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All of these ideas influenced Langdell’s thinking.38 In accordance with
his understanding that law is a scientific discipline and his belief that it
should be treated as such in the university setting, Langdell introduced into
the United States in the late nineteenth century a model of legal education
that survives, and even thrives, today.39
B. CONFLATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD WITH CASE
BOOK/SOCRATIC METHOD
Langdell’s oft-quoted theory of law as science is succinctly laid out in
his Contracts text book:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein
of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . . [T]he
number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is
commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same
doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent
to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the
cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so
classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable in their
number.40
The basic principles underlying Langdell’s pedagogy have been simply
stated:
1. Law involves a scientific analysis able to reveal the life-giving
principles of the common law.
2. This science of law could be advanced only by specially trained
researchers – not practitioners – who were committed to
disciplined analysis.
3. The subject most appropriate for such scientific analysis is the
body of written appellate opinions.

38. To the extent that science served as the paradigm for Langdell’s pedagogy, it would have
to be said that it consisted of an oleo of scientific philosophies then extant. See KIMBALL, supra
note 14, app. II, at 349-51 (making the point that Langdell’s purported reliance on natural science
in devising his teaching methods has been overstated).
39. Rubin, supra note 15, at 610-11; WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL
AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 27-31 (1982).
40. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii-ix (2d ed.
1879).
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4. Legal education means instilling techniques for scientific
probing into these opinions.
5. Like other sciences, law should be pursued under circumstances
most conducive to scientific thought, viz., in a university rather
than in the hurly-burly world of law offices and courts where law
is learned, at best, unscientifically.41
These principles have been thoroughly explained and analyzed;42 thus,
a brief overview will suffice here. With regard to the initial premise, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow points out that Langdell was noted for “[t]reating law (as
a field) as a science of principles learned by induction through reading cases
and systematically arranging their holdings into a coherent body of limited,
general principles.”43 He publicly asserted that “the approach to law
embodied in the Harvard curriculum was a form of natural science;” in fact,
he maintained that this approach was natural science itself.44 Classroom
exploration was, essentially, a search for the already known. Langdell
believed that by examining cases, students “would come to perceive the
enduring principles of Anglo-American law that lay behind them.”45
Similarly, Thomas Grey describes Langdell’s vision as one in which
“[t]he legal system was to be so arranged that it resolved hard disputes by
indubitable (even if complex) reasoning . . . . The system would be
predictable; people could know in which circumstances they would get the
aid and in which they would face the opposition of state power.”46 Legal
principles were to be discerned by inductive reasoning, and empirical
evidence was to be found in judicial decisions that had been published in
41. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 58 (1992);
see also Rudolph J. Gerber, Legal Education and Combat Preparedness, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 61, 67
(1989).
42. See generally James Barr Ames, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 1826-1906, in 8
GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 465, 483-85 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909); HARV. LAW SCH.
ASS’N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1817–1917 (1918);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); KIMBALL, supra note 14; ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1987); CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY
OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA, vol. 2 (1908).
43. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561.
44. Rubin, supra note 15, at 632.
45. Id. at 634. Rubin contends that Langdell was influenced by Louis Agassiz. Agassiz
insisted the biological world was composed of fixed, unchanging forms that had been specially
created, and he believed that empirical examination of particular plants and animals would reveal
the essential features of those forms. Id.
46. Grey, supra note 2, at 32. In Grey’s analysis, “[t]he core notion of classical legal science
can be grasped through the analogy to geometry, as that subject was understood in the late
nineteenth century.” Id. at 16; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35
(1881) (“The official theory is that a new decision follows syllogistically from existing
precedents.”).

2012]

LAW AS SCIENCE

31

court reporters.47 The Socratic method was the means by which “scientific”
principles or principles of knowledge would be “discovered” by students.48
What was radical about Langdell’s ideas was not the notion that law is
science, but the attendant proposal to overhaul legal education to adapt to
scientific inquiry. What Langdell and Harvard President Charles William
Eliot added was the application of scientific discovery to legal education,
that is, the idea that Socratic inquiry would disclose the principles that were
the source of law’s coherence.49 In a relatively short period of time, those
charged with educating students in the law “cast out the textbooks, and [in
their place] used . . . cases, carefully selected and arranged to illustrate the
meaning and development of principles of law.”50
This case book method became the “single most prominent feature of
twentieth-century American legal education.”51 The methodology has been
noted to incorporate dual strands: “first, the study of law through the
medium of judicial opinions, mainly appellate opinions, that have been
rendered in actual disputes; and second, the examination of these opinions
in a spirit that has often, and aptly, been described as ‘Socratic.’”52 The
change in textbooks was accompanied by a change in the role of law
faculty.53 A professor could no longer stand at the podium and lecture; he
was, instead, “a Socratic guide, leading the student to an understanding of
concepts and principles hidden as essences among the cases.”54
The expertise necessary to conduct in-class discovery of essential
principles was to be found not in practicing lawyers, but in legal academics,
the equivalent of researchers in the scientific community.55 Langdell and
his champion, Harvard President Eliot, were strongly influenced by the
German University system, which employed structured, directed
47. Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33; see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561.
48. Rubin, supra note 15, at 611-12.
49. Id. at 611.
50. David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny? — Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic
Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1597, 1604 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 531 (1973)). “Within fifty years of its introduction, the case
method and the accompanying Socratic method were firmly entrenched as the backbone of legal
education.” Id. “By the 1920s, anybody who was anybody in the law school ‘industry’ used the
case method,” presumably in tandem with the Socratic dialogue. Id. (quoting ROBERT STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 123 (1983)).
51. Anthony Kronman, The Socratic Method and the Development of the Moral Imagination,
31 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000).
52. Id.
53. See Garner, supra note 50, at 1604; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886–1937, at 94-95 (1998).
54. Garner, supra note 50, at 1604 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 531(1973)).
55. See Richard J. Wilson, Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of
Clinical Education, 10 GERMAN L. J. 823, 837 (2009); WIECEK, supra note 53, at 88-89, 94-95.
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questioning by full-time academics and relied heavily on library research in
legal analysis.56 According to Langdell, “the library is the proper workshop
of professors and students alike; . . . it is to us all that the laboratories of the
university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.”57 Judicial
decisions, published in court reporters, became the primary source of
empirical evidence.58 Thus, the birth of the Socratic method was intimately
intertwined with the replacement of textbooks by cases as the sole source of
instructional material. The origin of the term “Socratic method” has
generally been attributed to Langdell in the law school context,59 who saw it
as “a necessary adjunct to the case method of study.”60
Although no historical record contains an explicit definition of the
Socratic method as Langdell perceived it, his pedagogical methods in the
classroom have been described:
Langdell began his actual teaching by having each of the cases,
which the students had to study carefully in preparation for the
class, briefly analyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and
the law contained in it. He then added a series of questions, which
were so arranged as gradually to lay bare the entire law contained
in that particular case. This stimulated questions, doubts, and
objections on the part of individual students, against whom the
teacher had to hold his ground in reply. Teacher and pupils then,
according to Langdell’s design, work together unremittingly to
extract from the single cases and from the combination or
contrasting of cases their entire legal content, so that in the end
those principles of that particular branch of the law which control
the entire mass of related cases are made clear.61
This philosophy laid the foundation for law school pedagogy for the next
century.

56. See Wilson, supra note 55, at 837.
57. KIMBALL, supra note 14, at 350 (quoting Langdell, Address 1886, reprinted in 9 L. Q.
REV. 9, 49-50 (1887)).
58. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561; Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33.
59. Garner, supra note 50, at 1599 (footnote omitted).
60. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 406 (1971).
61. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF TEACHING 12 (2009).
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III. AN IMPERFECT EVOLUTION
Although the twentieth century saw a great many changes in the
conceptualization of scientific theory and method, the pedagogical shift
Langdell inaugurated in its earliest years took root and held fast. Changes
in law school pedagogy advanced far more slowly than the justifications for
retaining the case book method.
A. CRITIQUES OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD PARADIGM
Even as Langdell struggled to convince colleagues and students of the
value of his pedagogy,62 the world of science was undergoing its own
transformation.
Certainly inductive science, and to some extent,
hypothetico-deductivism, were insufficient to explain the full range of
scientific phenomena. Even assuming the general reliability of sensory
experience, memory, and testimony, the impossibility of examining all
germane data was obvious. Unrevealed data could always contradict the
predictions of any known scientific law, and every theory was suspended in
proof because of the infinite number of possible empirical outcomes. A
theory could be confirmed to some extent by empirical data, but it could
never be conclusively confirmed.
These and other critiques found their way into the field of “legal
science.” Case law is an ever-expanding field of data; thus, in law, as in
science, new data would always threaten empirical outcomes and
coincidentally the principles resting on them. Specifically with respect to
law, data derived from studying cases was admittedly distinguishable from
sensory data obtained through observation.63 Yet Langdell made few
concessions to progressive theories, including Darwinism,64 and with
respect to applications to legal education, he remained steadfast in his
adherence to earlier conceptions of science and scientific analysis.65
Despite the fact that, almost since the inception of his methods, the
scientific foundations were met with skepticism, Langdell’s case
book/Socratic pedagogy spread unremittingly across the legal academic
landscape during the first twenty years of the twentieth century.66
62. Langdell’s ideas by no means received immediate acceptance. See, e.g., JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 47 (1978); Robert
Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1995) (book
review). Oliver Wendell Holmes was, at times, a particularly vocal critic. William Epstein, The
Classical Tradition of Dialectics and American Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 399400 (1981).
63. Grey, supra note 2, at 20-21.
64. Id. at 28-29; Rubin, supra note 15, at 634.
65. Rubin, supra note 15, at 634.
66. See id. at 612-13, 634.
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Grey noted that “[o]n first encounter, the very idea of ‘legal science’
held by Langdell and his followers is baffling.”67 Others have described it
as “an incomprehensible jumble of induction with deduction and of norm
with fact,”68 and “[t]ranscendental nonsense.”69 It has been argued that its
claims to empiricism and amoralism cannot be justified given the classroom
discussions to which it leads lend themselves to both conceptual thinking
and normative judgments.70 Even the notion that this pedagogy is Socratic
has had numerous detractors.71 In a very short time, the scientific theory
paradigm attributed to Langdell was “obsolete in entirety.”72
Today the rhetoric seems to have softened. Anthony Kronman sees in
the Socratic method simply a healthy skepticism for all judicial
pronouncements.73
Socratic questioning provides students with
opportunities to draw distinctions and analogies, reconcile apparently
inconsistent judgments, and make judgments about the soundness of legal
reasoning.74 Such probing analysis places the burden on students to
articulate what they understand the judicial authorities to be saying.75 From
this perspective, the classroom is still viewed as a kind of scientific
laboratory, in which professors convey knowledge and engage students in
the “central activities of the natural or social scientist: hypothesis,
experimentation, and refinement of the hypothesis in response to test
results.”76 It is a classroom scene that has survived, however, says Paul
Carrington, “only because wiser men than Langdell, perceiving a moral
subtext where he saw only the surface gloss of ‘legal science,’ had effected
a separation of the method from its author’s madness, and so freed posterity

67. Grey, supra note 2, at 16 (observing that one view of Langdell’s pedagogy is that of “a
deductive natural law system based on self-evident moral axioms”).
68. Id.
69. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).
70. Grey, supra note 2, at 16 (“Langdell’s kind of theory . . . claims to be empirical and yet
its practice is highly conceptual; it delivers normative judgments, yet proclaims the positivist
autonomy of law from morals.”).
71. “After all,” as Harvard law professor Phillip E. Areeda was wont to point out, “Socrates
had never heard of Lawrence v. Fox; Palsgraf . . . .” Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (Sm)
(Lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 911 (1996).
72. Rubin, supra note 15, at 635.
73. See Kronman, supra note 51, at 647.
74. Areeda, supra note 71, at 915-16.
75. Id.
76. Philip M. Genty, Overcoming Cultural Blindness in International Clinical
Collaboration: The Divide Between Civil and Common Law Cultures and Its Implications for
Clinical Education, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 152 (2008).
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from ‘transcendental nonsense’ to teach the enduring morality of republican
politics and law.”77
B. SURVIVAL OF LANGDELL’S METHODS
The critics have been persistent and frequently harsh; but Langdell’s
paradigm has survived, and the methodologies he introduced have persisted,
albeit in a modified form. There are those who still see the method as akin
to inductive natural science, designed to engender a “true understanding of
first principles . . . . [and] ultimate good and truth.”78 Learning law is seen
from this perspective solely in terms of discovery. Others are less sanguine
about the notion of first principles and see the method as refutational only,
with any purported demonstration of truth or proof occurring as “an
accidental byproduct.”79 The analogy to science is described as at least
quasi-deductive, although still essentially a process of discovery:
“understanding the problem, discerning the knowns and the unknowns,
applying related theorems or principles, and conducting a trial-and-error
process of experimentation.”80 The German system, from which Langdell
borrowed, as well as other civil law systems, still approaches law as a set of
fundamental norms which, by deduction, govern operative facts.81 Most
agree, however, that the real lasting virtue of Langdell’s philosophy is to be
found less in the premise of law as science and more in the methodology he
adopted, a methodology that recalls earlier glory days of scientific
rationalism and possesses other virtues that might call for its preservation.
Despite the criticisms, the case method and the Socratic method have
largely been seen not only as compatible with each other,82 but as having
compatibility with scientific method, arising from the “essential duality and
definitive ambiguities of the classic method.”83 This compatibility theory,
with its associations to a scientific theory of discovery, seems to have stuck,
in part perhaps because of a belief that the activity in the Socratic-like
77. Christopher Tomlins, Bruce A. Kimball, the Inception of Modern Professional
Education: C.C. Langdell, 1826-1906, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 657, 658 (2010) (book review).
78. Epstein, supra note 62, at 404.
79. Harold Tarrant, Elenchos and Exetasis:
Capturing the Purpose of Socratic
Interrogation, in DOES SOCRATES HAVE A METHOD?: RETHINKING THE ELENCHUS IN PLATO’S
DIALOGUES AND BEYOND 61, 63 (Gary Alan Scott ed., 2002).
80. Robert J. Rhee, The Socratic Method and the Mathematical Heuristic of George Polya,
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881, 887 (2007); see generally Donald G. Marshall, Socratic Method and
Irreducible Core of Legal Education, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (calling for the revival of the
Socratic method, defined as allowing for student discovery of principles).
81. Wilson, supra note 55, at 837.
82. Id.
83. Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
597, 613 (2008).
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classroom has the appearance of scientific laboratory work. As MenkelMeadow points out, this claim made the law school classroom unique in
graduate studies; it was a place of active experience, not passive attendance
at lectures.84 Although Langdell did not expressly make the connection,
others later demonstrated parallels between law and the social sciences,
which were developing a methodological affinity to the natural sciences
even during Langdell’s era.85 The derivative analogy to science, combined
with the persistent myth of scientific discovery, was enough to maintain the
security of the pedagogical practices.
Romantic notions about scientific reasoning and hopes for the
discovery of unchanging laws of nature have made the analogy of legal
analysis to scientific method attractive. But another reason for the
longevity of Langdell’s pedagogy, as Grey noted more than a quarter
century ago, may be the fact that the rejection of Langdell’s theory left legal
academics with no conceptual scheme with which to revitalize the law
school curriculum.86 Academics have struggled to find a credible
functional analogy ever since legal formalism was targeted by the legal
realists in the early twentieth century. Conceptual frameworks of policy
science and legal process advanced in the mid-twentieth century had limited
success;87 more recently, law and economics has marshaled similarly
limited adherence.88
In the void, a number of academics have written to defend the watereddown practices of case examination and Socratic-style interrogation, while
paying no heed to scientific theory. Whether or not the Socratic/case book
methodology is explicitly conceived of as science, generations of law
teachers have adopted the methods and extolled their virtues. Langdell, it
could be said, is often perceived as having been right for the wrong reasons.
Among the virtues that have been espoused are:
 Learning the analytical process.
Students learn to
89
synthesize rules of law. They get a feel for the boundary
conflicts that define, at any given moment, the margins of
a field in the most economical way possible.90 The

84. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 582.
85. Rubin, supra note 15, at 636, 634-40 (discussing functional data gathering approach);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 567.
86. Grey, supra note 2, at 49.
87. Id. at 50; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 567.
88. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 568; Grey, supra note 2, at 51.
89. Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 987 (2005).
90. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648.
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internalization of that questioning process91 becomes a
concrete analytical tool for the student.92
Exposure to real client dilemmas. Provided with a
“steady stream” of “complex, real-life dilemmas of
clients,”93 students use their knowledge of the law to work
on particular cases, “the most difficult and most important
art.”94
Practice for advocacy. Students learn to deal with the
pressures they will face in the practice of law.95 The
pedagogy promotes rhetorical abilities needed in law
practice96 by forcing students “to state issues and rules
with precision and then to test their understanding of
those rules in new factual settings.”97 They “learn the
need for mental agility in handling rapid fire
questioning”98 through the process of performing before
peers and the instructor.
Coping with moral ambiguity.
Students learn the
relationship of rules to their underlying justifications or
policies that support those rules.99 The goal is to
“habituat[e] students to the need for reasoned judgment
under conditions of maximum moral ambiguity . . . giving
them practice at rendering such judgments themselves.”100
This challenges “students’ views and forces them to think
more deeply than they may have done before attending
law school.”101
Self discovery. Skillful examination by the professor
insures that students will discover legal principles for
themselves.102 Students become confident that they can

91. Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method: An Interview with Martin B.
Louis (1934-94), 73 N.C. L. REV. 957, 957 (1995).
92. Rhee, supra note 80, at 882.
93. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648.
94. Powell, supra note 91, at 987.
95. Vitiello, supra note 89, at 987.
96. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648.
97. Vitiello, supra note 89, at 987.
98. Id. at 986-87.
99. Id. at 987.
100. Kronman, supra note 51, at 652.
101. Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama
Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869, 902 (2006).
102. Marshall, supra note 80, at 13.
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discover answers on their own and can “reason through”
what they know to solve a problem.103
If these are the goals, however, there are many educational models that
would serve better. The attachment to scientific method hardly seems
adequate to sustain the current pedagogy.104 In contrast to the apologists for
the Langdell pedagogy, there have been other voices, voices explicitly
calling for a new conceptual paradigm or framework for the first year
pedagogy. Menkel-Meadow, for example, proposes an interdisciplinary
framework,105 and Robert Rhee advocates the mathematical heuristic of
George Polya.106
Notably, these suggested new paradigms are
characterized as creative,107 and even generative.108
IV. THE NEW PARADIGM
This section identifies a few of the major theories in the philosophy and
history of science developed during the last eighty years. These theories
define science not as the discovery of fixed principles, but as rhetorical
invention and/or creative reconceptualization. When these ideas are parsed,
it is possible to see that a scientific paradigm may be the conceptual
framework to fill the void.
The ideas of two scientific philosophers have been particularly
influential in the last century. In 1934, Popper published THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY,
which
repudiated
the
longstanding
observationalist-inductivist account of scientific method and advocated
empirical falsifiability as the criterion for distinguishing scientific work
from non-science.109 Popper’s main contributions to scientific philosophy
were to demonstrate the flaws of inductivism,110 and to explain why a
103. Powell, supra note 91, at 957.
104. The critics of the pedagogy abound. See, e.g., Chester Alumbaugh & Scott E.
Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First Year Legal Education: Toward a New Pedagogical
Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 21 (1991); Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest
Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249, 249
(1997); Thomas D. Eisele, The Poverty of Socratic Questioning: Asking and Answering in the
Meno, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 221, 221 (1994); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School, 81
U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907 (1933); Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1
YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 71, 71 (1970).
105. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 557. Interestingly, the disciplines identified by
Menkel-Meadow seem to exclude traditional sciences.
106. Rhee, supra note 80, at 882.
107. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 559; Rhee, supra note 80, at 897.
108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 559.
109. POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 17-20.
110. Inductivism here refers to the idea, often attributed to Francis Bacon, that to develop
theories about cause and effect, one needs to make specific observations of phenomenological
results from experiments made in controlled conditions, and to generalize therefrom. In general,
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theory cannot originate exclusively from empirical data.111 He also
convincingly argued that data is selective and subject to human choice,
thereby undermining faith in scientists’ ability to objectively observe the
world.112
Then, in 1962, Kuhn published THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS in which he argued there was little evidence of scientists
actually following Popper’s falsificationist methodology and described the
work of scientists as operating with a series of paradigms.113 Kuhn
approaches science from a historical perspective and has determined that
the history of science is characterized by revolutions in scientific
perspective.114 Observing the changes in scientific thought and practices,
Kuhn concludes that revolutionary changes happen through a process of
definition.115 The ideas that have developed in the wake of these theories
have relevance to legal as well as to scientific thought.
Popper’s skepticism about the viability of inductive proof to science
was not new. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, the empiricist David
Hume argued there were serious logical problems with induction.116 In the
mid-twentieth century, Popper joined those who believed science would
best progress using deductive reasoning as its primary emphasis. His
critique of the prevailing scientific method, which came to be known as
critical rationalism, was based in large part on the apparent impossibility of
recording everything observed.117
At the core of Popper’s theory is the notion of a logical asymmetry
between verification and falsifiability. His idea is that no scientific
principle can be verified by scientific testing, but can only be “falsified” by
observation or experiment.118 Some process of selection is needed, Popper
Bacon began with the premise that “what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction
which shall analyze experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and
rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.” FRANCIS BACON, THE PLAN OF THE INSTAURATIO
MAGNA (1620), excerpted in 39 HARVARD CLASSICS 127, 140 (1909).
111. POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 84.
112. Id. at 86.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 92.
116. HOWSON, supra note 27, at 10-12.
117. See generally KARL POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING (1994) [hereinafter
POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING]; KARL POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTATION: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (1963) [hereinafter POPPER, CONJECTURE AND
REFUTATION]; KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
(1972)[hereinafter POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE]; POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY, supra note 27.
118. POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTATION, supra note 117, at vii; POPPER, OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 117, at 119; see also, THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 113 (2d. ed. 1970); PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 111 (1975).
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noted, and thus observation is always selective.119 A precondition to any
selection process is a theoretical preconception about what is to be
empirically examined.120 Without a working hypothesis there can be no
way to determine which data are germane.121 That being the case, Popper
argued there can be no sound justification for devising a general rule from
the observation of particulars.122 Induction cannot yield certainty.123
In Popper’s view, scientific theory should make predictions, but
empirical methods should be aimed at disproving theories rather than
continuously attempting to prove them.124 The more generally applicable a
theory can be shown to be, the greater its value. Outcomes could
potentially falsify a theory, but can never definitively prove the positive.
Thus, in his view, scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is
irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical, and is generated by the imagination
in order to solve problems that have arisen in specific historical/ cultural
settings.125 Accordingly, scientific method can aid in a progression toward
truth but can never produce a final, definitive explanation.126
Popper’s critics concede that data is selective, but contend that
although researchers often have a theory to guide data selection, they don’t
necessarily follow it consciously or prescriptively.127 Moreover, it has been
argued, just as it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate an immutable
principle through continuous observation, it is impossible to conclusively
falsify theories by empirical data.128 “Falsification[],” as Martin Gardner
indicates, “can be as fuzzy and elusive as confirmations.”129 What critics
chiefly take issue with, however, is the idea that a single method of analysis
applies to all science.130 Kuhn in particular has been critical of any such
overly simplistic picture of science.

119. POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 89, 104-15.
120. POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 72.
121. Id. at 72-73.
122. Id. at 75-76.
123. Id. at 4, 76; KUHN, supra note 118, at 52.
124. See POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 4.
125. See generally id. at 57-74 (giving a more detailed exploration of falsifiability).
126. See id. at 6-8.
127. ANTHONY O’HEAR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 39-41 (1989);
KUHN, supra note 118, at 4.
128. MARTIN GARDNER, ARE UNIVERSES THICKER THAN BLACKBERRIES? 13 (2004); CARL
GUSTAV HEMPEL, SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 203 (Richard Jeffrey ed., 2000); KUHN,
supra note 118, at 4.
129. GARDNER, supra note 128, at 13; KUHN, supra note 118, at 4-5.
130. See generally LARRY LAUDEN, SCIENCE AND VALUES: THE AIMS OF SCIENCE AND
THEIR ROLES IN SCIENTIFIC DEBATE 16 (1986) (discussing, in particular, the work of Paul
Feyerabend and Ian Mistroff).
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Like Popper, Kuhn maintains all observation is theory laden, driven by
a paradigm that is encoded with a particular interpretation of the world.131
According to Kuhn, the dominant paradigm is accepted as knowledge until
anomalies are discovered. Scientists then begin to question the basis of the
paradigm itself, new theories emerge which challenge the dominant
paradigm, and eventually one of these new theories becomes accepted as
the new paradigm.132 Thus, science does not progress via a linear
accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic revolutions, or
paradigm shifts, whereby the nature of scientific inquiry is abruptly
transformed.133
Science, in Kuhn’s view, progresses through three distinct stages:
prescience, normal science, and revolutionary science.134 Normal science is
clearly distinguishable from revolutionary science. The former builds on
past knowledge using existing paradigms: routine, specific, pre-patterned
and accessible methods of problem solving. It actualizes theory by
increasing the number of matches between data discovered (often through
experimentation) and predictions.135 Thus the norm is “an attempt to force
nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm
supplies.”136 Revolutionary science, on the other hand, generally begins
with awareness of an anomaly in the data. The ensuing empirical study
explores how far the anomaly extends or how frequently it occurs.137 In the
field, this can lead to crisis, precipitated by a string of anomalous results,
which thereby force the creation of a new paradigm. Until scientists
actually see nature in a different way, however, the new facts are not seen
as scientific facts at all – merely as anomalies. It requires a new paradigm
to subsume the old results along with the anomalous results into a new
framework.138 The work of Herbert Simons139 and Richard Rorty,140

131. JAMES A. MARCUM, THOMAS KUHN’S REVOLUTION: AN HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 60-61 (2008).
132. Compare KUHN, supra note 118, at 60-65 with FEYERABEND, supra note 118, at 30-31.
Feyerabend argues for a far more skeptical approach to knowledge, asserting that since no one can
predict what shape future knowledge will have, one universal method of gaining knowledge
should never be assumed. Feyerabend agrees with Kuhn that the history of science is the history
of different viewpoints, and for Feyerabend this means that what counts as “knowledge” in the
future may have paradigms we cannot yet know. Because we cannot yet know them, we should
not attempt to forbid future intellectual enterprise by attempting to define one narrow dominant
paradigm of knowledge using any particular model.
133. JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 137-38.
134. KUHN, supra note 118, at 92-95.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 53.
138. Id.
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among others, helped develop the idea that Kuhn’s STRUCTURE is rhetorical
and, by implication, that science itself is rhetorical in nature.
The science of the post-modern world may not seem to suggest a
paradigm for the field of law, which almost by definition demands some
measure of constancy and consistency. But in law, as in science, successful
analysis depends on the ability to group or associate situations into what
Kuhn calls “similarity sets.”141 Moreover, it should be remembered that
when relying on theories, scientists use assumptions that are supported by
empirical evidence, despite the fact that an infinite number of other theories
might explain the exact same set of data. In both fields, a heightened
inquiry into similarity groupings – asking the question, “similar to what?” –
advances understandings, past the automatic, unreflective, “primitive” stage
of categorization, towards a possible transfer of subsets into a separate or
new category.142 This is the practical foundation of critical change.143
Lawyers who, like scientists, can and do engage in this type of heightened
analysis, could be expanding their pedagogy to include the broader view of
science of knowledge progressing through conceptual paradigm shifts and
invention. Today’s world is one of accelerating paradigm shifts and
innovations, and begs the introduction of skills to manage rapid changes.144
A neoglobal perspective also calls for study that integrates macro-analysis
of systems with the microanalysis of individual cases.145
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PARADIGM
A few examples of how a modern scientific model might apply in
today’s law schools will help clarify matters. Using the legal principles and
paradigms relating to defenses to negligence, the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, and statutory construction of sexual harassment,
the applicability of scientific method can be demonstrated.

139. See Herbert W. Simons, Are Scientists Rhetors in Disguise? An Analysis of Discursive
Processes within Scientific Communities, in RHETORIC IN TRANSITION 115, 115 (Eugene E. White
ed., 1980).
140. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
141. KUHN, supra note 118, at 200.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 13.
145. Id. at 20 (expounding on the notion that Johnson calls “the long zoom”).
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A. DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE
At common law, only two defenses to negligence were recognized:
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.146
Either defense
successfully asserted operated as a complete bar to recovery by a
plaintiff.147 Contributory negligence has been defined as conduct on the
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of care to which a
reasonable person should conform for self protection, and which is a legally
contributing cause in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff. 148 Under a
Langdellian approach to law, the rule at common law was clear:
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a torts suit barred
recovery absolutely. An empirical study of thousands of cases in the
nineteenth century would surely have supported this legal principle.
Over time, of course, anomalies started to appear. In England, in 1842,
a court decided to instruct a jury that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence
was not a complete bar to recovery if the defendant still had an opportunity
to avoid harm after the plaintiff’s contributory negligence occurred, and
negligently failed to avail himself of that opportunity.149 Similar court
rulings followed, and a new paradigm was born: last clear chance.150
Last Clear Chance was, indeed, a paradigmatic shift. It has been
characterized as a humanitarian doctrine, one meant to soften the harsh
results of depriving the plaintiff of all recovery in the situation in which the
plaintiff bears little responsibility for the harm done.151 In other words,
contributory negligence, the immutable rule, was not working. Thus, what
was demanded was not a tortuous mangling of facts to conform to an
inflexible law or an application of an inflexible law that would result in

146. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman Adm’x, 275 U.S. 66, 66 (1927) (If defendant
found himself “in an emergency,” it was incumbent on him to take precautions.); Brown v.
Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850); Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 665 (1824)
(“[T]o entitle the plaintiff to an action to damages resulting from a nuisance he must show that he
acted with common and ordinary caution.”); Bayly v. Merrel, (1615) 79 Eng. Rep. 331 (K.B.) 331
(“[T]he law gives no remedy for voluntary negligence.”); Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng.
Rep. 926 (K.B.) 927; see also Francis H. Bohlen, Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 16-18
(1906).
147. Merrel, 79 Eng. Rep. at 331; Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926; Smith, Mass. (2 Pick.) at
641-65; Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296; Goodman, 275 U.S. at 66 (noting that where standard
of care is clear, question of due care is not for jury to decide); see also Bohlen, supra note 146, at
16-18.
148. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977).
149. Davies v. Mann, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 588-89.
150. Fuller v. Illinois Cen. R. Co., 56 So. 783, 785 (1911); Kumkumian v. City of New York,
111 N.Y.S. 2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
151. See generally Robert E. Cook, Torts – Last Clear Chance Doctrine as Humanitarian
Rule, 1 WM. & REV. VA. L. 64 (1950).
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injustice; what was needed was a creative novel doctrine to take into
account new knowledge and to satisfy actual human needs.
Last Clear Chance, as a doctrine, could be viewed as an experiment, an
“attempted solution,” in Popper’s words. Although the doctrine was further
refined over time to distinguish between helpless plaintiffs and inattentive
plaintiffs,152 it seems, in operation, to have had limited utility. This is in
large part because lawmakers came to recognize the need for a more
significant paradigm shift and crafted a solution to deal with the problem of
a complete bar on recovery under contributory negligence principles. Most
states, either through common or law or by statute, adopted a comparative
negligence or comparative fault approach to determining fault and damages,
allowing plaintiffs to make partial recoveries based on a concept of
proportional responsibility.153
In this evolution can be seen a “network of commitments” akin to
puzzle solving in the scientific realm.154 The process follows a pattern of
conceptual/theoretical/instrumental/methodological development.
For
years, lawyers understood the world as it was ordered, in accordance with
an accepted notion of negligence (the conceptual). This idea took shape as
more precise doctrine, and was applied with far-reaching scope
(theoretical). Over time, courts scrutinized more and more carefully the
“pockets of disorder” arising in negligence cases and sought to reconcile
actual results with predictions indicated by the theory (instrumental). This
led to refinements in the law (methodological), and the process was
reiterated.155
B. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In the criminal procedure area, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clause provides another interesting example. In this
instance, the inquiry for student scholars begins with a constitutional
provision, the origins of which are not well understood. It is known that the
phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” was lifted or borrowed from the
1689 English Bill of Rights, but beyond that, scholars have unearthed no
clear indication of the framers’ intent as to the meaning and scope of the
clause. Contemporaneously, the Crimes Act of 1790, in addition to
providing for the imposition of death by hanging in certain cases, granted
courts the right to require corpse dissection in cases of treason, and
152. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 159
(2003) (discussing Prosser’s theories on the subject).
153. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (2000).
154. KUHN, supra note 118, at 42.
155. See id. (describing the scientific process).
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whipping or standing in pillory for some lesser offenses.156 One hundred
years later, about the time Langdell became Harvard’s law school dean, In
re Kemmler157 was decided. In that case, the Supreme Court made note of
earlier punitive practices, such as burning at the stake, crucifixion, and
breaking on a wheel, that would no longer be deemed acceptable. In the
same opinion, the Court determined that a relatively new method of
execution, electrocution, did not offend constitutional standards relating to
“cruel and unusual” punishment.158 Another hundred years would find
some courts outlawing electrocution as cruel and unusual within the
definitions of their state constitutions.159
Students investigating whether a particular practice constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment would be likely to find Popper’s observations
about scientific method quite apt. In Eighth Amendment cases, students
would need a theoretical preconception about what is being examined, and
they would likely find that courts in these cases had been working from
similar preconceptions. That notion, in fact, now seems to be the explicit
basis for courts’ analyses.
Since 1958, with the decision in Trop v. Dulles,160 the standard for
determining the constitutionality of any punitive method has been whether
it is consistent with “evolving standards of decency.”161 In Trop, the Court
held that denaturalization as punishment for desertion is “obnoxious” in an
“enlightened democracy.”162 On similar grounds, the Court held that
twelve to twenty years in chains for the offense of making a false statement
in a public record,163 or a prison sentence for a mere status offense,164 is
inconsistent with modern sensibilities and norms.
Empirical “observations” of other court decisions would be
confounding to researchers looking for the “fundamental doctrine” guiding
principled decision making.
They might discover that the Eighth
Amendment is implicated when criminal punishments are being carried
out,165 but only if the conduct under scrutiny is actual punishment and not
156. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, §§ 4, 15,
18, 1 Stat. 112, 113, 115-16 (1790).
157. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
158. In re Kremmler, 136 U.S. at 443.
159. Notably one such court is Georgia’s Supreme Court. Dawson v. State, 554 S.E. 2d 137,
139 (Ga. 2001); see also State v. Mata, 745 N.W. 2d 229, 255-80 (Neb. 2008).
160. 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 100-02.
163. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357-82 (1910).
164. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662-68 (1962).
165. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992)
(both involving beatings by prison guards).
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an incidental condition of confinement.166 Although they are technically,
under current categorical definitions, conditions of confinement and not
punishments, deliberate deprivations of essentials such as food, heart, and
medical care (for serious medical needs) can be cruel and unusual
punishment,167 but officials must have actual awareness of the risk and
deliberately disregard known rules of custodial care.168 The Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit a second attempt at imposing death by
electrocution after a badly botched first attempt;169 it is not implicated in
situations involving school punishment.170 The execution of mentally
incapacitated persons is considered cruel,171 as is execution of those who
were juveniles at the time of a crime’s commission172 – “juvenile” being a
distinction that did not even exist at time Langdell took the reins at
Harvard.
As Popper would have argued, given this set of data, there can be no
sound justification for devising a general rule from the observation of
particulars. Kuhn would further point out that the data here illustrates how
knowledge is only as good as the particular examples that support the
underlying paradigm – in this case, “evolving standards of decency.”173
When, as here, anomalies are not only discovered, but proliferate, it is time
to question the basis of the paradigm itself and create new theories.
Eventually, one will emerge that will find acceptance as the new paradigm.
C. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The old scientific method paradigm privileged common law over
statutory law. With a new scientific model, it is far easier to see how law
can be invented. One example in the field of constitutional law can be
found in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment, as a legal concept, had no
real existence even fifty years ago. The origins of the term, used to apply to
behaviors well known to have been transpiring throughout history,
reportedly go back to the early 1970s.174 At that time, a group of feminists,
166. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994); Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 338 (3d Cir. 2010); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.
3d 157, 190 (2d Cir. 2008); Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 1998).
167. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04
(1976).
168. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 836-37.
169. La. ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 459 (1947).
170. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 651 (1977).
171. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399-40 (1986); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
304 (2002).
172. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
173. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
174. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 281 (1999).
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meeting on Cornell’s campus and discussing a potential case, came up with
the term to describe situational harms with which they were all familiar. 175
As a legal concept, the term first appears in the case law in 1974, in the case
of Barnes v. Train.176 Then, in 1976 Williams v. Saxbe177 was decided,
finding sexual harassment to be a form of sexual discrimination.178 The
judicial adoption of the legal concept was followed by enactment of EEOC
guidelines in 1980, which explicitly prohibited sexual harassment as a form
of sexual discrimination. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,179 decided in
1986, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.180
Sexual harassment is a clear example of a paradigmatic change that has
come about through creation, invention and experimentation. The women
who analyzed existing data in the 1970s developed a new theory from a
number of existing theories, relying on data both old and new. Initial
attempts to obtain relief under the law began with a process described by
Kuhn, which he credits Wittgenstein with developing.181 The process is
that by which one confronting a new situation assigns it to a category (or
“natural family”) believed to have similar characteristics or overlapping
resemblances. In sexual harassment situations, those familiar “families”
were criminal assault and sex discrimination. The transfer of a subset of
assault victims into the category of sex discrimination signaled a “critical
change” in the legal paradigm.182 The new theories were tested in the
courts and proffered to law and rule-making bodies, and with this
methodological shift came a conceptual one.183
Thus, it is clear that the work of the lawyer-scientist-researcher was not
(and is not) static or passive; discovery is only one aspect of the work that
has been done. In fact, as recent commentators tell us, science most
succeeds when it involves experimentation in, and a search for,
recombinations of constituent elements.184 Put another way, “ideas are

175. KATHRIN S. ZIPPEL, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND GERMANY 53-54 (2006).
176. 13 FEP Cases 123 (D.C. 1974), rev’d, sub nom. 561 F. 2d 983, 983 (D.C. Cir 1977).
177. 413 F. Supp. 665, 665 (D. D.C. 1976), rev’d and remanded on other grds; Williams v.
Bell, 587 F. 2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
178. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 665.
179. 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
180. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57.
181. KUHN, supra note 118, at 45.
182. Id. at 200.
183. This example of the women’s brainstorming processes also illustrates the importance of
innovative environments to progress. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 41.
184. Id.

48

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:21

works of bricolage; they’re built out of detritus.”185 The lawyer’s work has
also involved theorizing, hypothesis testing, creation, invention, and
reconceptualization. This has always been the lawyer’s work, and it finds a
parallel in scientific method.
VI. CONCLUSION
In earlier times, one of the attractions of science as an analogy to law
was its purported certainty and predictability. In 1934, Popper directly
questioned this assumption and proposed a different way of looking at
scientific study. As he later explained his thinking:
The natural as well as the social sciences always start from
problems, from the fact that something inspires amazement in us,
as the Greek philosophers used to say. To solve these problems,
the sciences use fundamentally the same method that common
sense employs, the method of trial and error. To be more precise,
it is the method of trying out solutions to our problem and then
discarding the false ones as erroneous.186
What would happen if we were to think about law in this way? Or
what if first-year teachers were to begin with a Kuhnian perspective, that
the world of law is structured according to certain paradigms, that law is
built on a belief that society needs these ordered paradigms to survive, but
that they are more conventional and utilitarian than true or certain? Wills
and contracts are the inventions of lawyers. Property, privacy, guilt – these
are all intellectual constructs, operational principles, that aid in the ordering
of “knowledge.” They are not, and never were, essential truths.
We value order, we crave certainty and predictability, and it is clear
that to avoid total anarchy or chaos, as a policy matter, society should not
recreate the world with every dispute. But law can and must change;
indeed, it is the responsibility of lawyers to advocate for change and to reform the law by generating new paradigms and creating novel technologies.
Law school should teach rising lawyers something about how to be creative
and inventive and provide guidance in how to make responsible judgments
about when paradigm shifting might be called for.
Today’s law schools are undergoing a shift in perspective if not a
revolution on the scale of Langdell’s. The change is creating conflict,
inevitably accompanied by both attempts to salvage the past and pressures
to overthrow the past. As the evidence of a transformation grows, however,

185. Id. at 28.
186. POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 117, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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so too will the clamor for an analogy that can serve as a guiding rationale
for any major changes. The lure of a scientific analogy is still powerful. As
in the days of Langdell, many hold to the belief that “science” is “reserved
for fields that do progress in obvious ways.”187 It is a club to which many
professionals want to belong or with which they would like to be
associated. For that reason, many academics are inclined to seek parallels
between their own professions and the “hard” sciences, and look for
analogic techniques, methods or ideologies that would permit a claim to the
scientific appellation.
In this environment, what science might now offer to law is a process
that includes these strategies:
1. Observations, using textual and sensory sources, by means of
which students discover what the law “is,” both textually and
operationally;
2. Identification of the conceptual paradigms or perspectives that
support the law;
3. Development of strategies for communicating and upholding the
soundness of existing paradigms;
4. Development of skills needed to test existing rules and
standards and to attempt new solutions, using multiple
methodologies; and
5. Exploration and assessment of values needed to make
judgments about the propriety of paradigm shifts.
The first two of these strategies incorporate the knowledge domain
identified in the Carnegie Report,188 but go beyond empirical data collection
in courts and legislatures. Strategies 3 and 4 address the skill dimension of
Carnegie;189 and the values dimension is embedded in the last strategy.190
Law schools have considerable expertise in these various strategies,
although doctrinal knowledge, skills, and values have often occupied
separate spheres and have been assigned to widely varying and often
conflicting conceptual frameworks. Law school professors currently ask
students to assert, defend, and compare, with an implicit emphasis on the
importance of understanding existing paradigms. An unstated message of
immutability, correctness, and permanence often accompanies this

187.
188.
189.
190.

KUHN, supra note 118, at 171.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 28.
Id.
Id.
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approach. Mastery of existing rules provides a source of satisfaction to
learners of the law.
But in much the same way that academics approach problems in their
scholarship, not only calling into question the rationale and efficacy of law
and its operations, but offering new models and overlooked perspectives,
they could, in their pedagogical roles, teach students how to do the same.
Law professors could be more deliberate about asking students what is not
working in the particular paradigm they are uncovering, and what might be
some ways to think about making it better. The real pressures of societal
needs – the consequences of law – should also be part of the analysis. The
science paradigm of the twenty-first century provides a shift in perspective
that allows for the reordering of knowledge that is more inclusive of
multiple existing realities and opens the gates for creativity and new
understanding. The law school classroom is an optimal environment for
this work. The classroom can be modeled on a scientific think tank, where
highly motivated and focused people come together, widening the pool of
contributing minds and increasing the likelihood for innovation and
progress.191 This is not so different in concept from Langdell’s vision of a
legal scientific laboratory.
As much as we crave certainty, law cannot provide it. Through such
inventions as rights, stare decisis, and legislative mandates, legal systems
can provide a sense of order and enough predictability and stability to allow
societies to function on this side of anarchy. But law, like science, is not
static and the knowledge required to perfect legal decision making lies far
beyond human capacity. What we can do is take account of what we do
know and what we have given members of our community (notably judges
and to some extent legislative and administrative bodies) the power to say,
and from that point, engage in the inventive and creative work of science.
This will allow us to measure progress and success “in terms of evolution
from the community’s state of knowledge at any given time.”192 We can
then use the model of science not to discover the right answer – as in
incontrovertible – but to create and use conceptual paradigms with a goal of
aspiring to the right answer – as in fair and just.

191. JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 54, 58. Johnson relies heavily on the work of Kevin
Dunbar in developing this idea. Id. at 59-62.
192. KUHN, supra note 118, at 171.

